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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL BAUM d/b/a 
BAUMWEAR BY MICHAEL BAUM, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
DEAN KNIGHT, d/b/a 
THE FASHION CORNER, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case No. 20493 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT DEAN KNIGHT 
d/b/a THE FASHION CORNER 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was Mark Grayson an agent of Baum or of Knight? 
2. Did Mark Grayson have apparent authority from 
Baum to receive notice from Knight of the rejection of the 
goods? 
3. Did Knight give Baum timely notice of his 
rejection of the goods under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-602(l)? 
4. Was Knight entitled to reject the goods as 
failing to conform to the contract under Utah Code Ann. § 
70A-2-601? 
5. Did the goods fail to conform to express or 
implied warranties? 
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6. Did the lower court properly consider the usage 
of trade as giving meaning to the agreement between the parties 
as required by Utah Code Ann. §§ 7QA-l-205(3) and -208(2)? 
7. Did the lower court err in failing to construe 
the contract as consistent with the usage of trade? 
8. Did Mark Grayson have actual, implied, or 
apparent authority from Baum to act in accordance with the 
usage of trade in receiving notice of rejection by Knight and 
in giving further instructions regarding the disposition of the 
goods? 
9. Did the lower court err in failing to hold that 
Baum failed to mitigate his damages? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a Judgment against Knight on a 
contract alleged to exist between Baum and Knight. 
B. Disposition of the Case Below. 
The case was tried to the court on November 28, 1984. 
The court issued a Memorandum Decision in Baum's favor (R. 
189-92) on which Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
entered (R. 196-99). 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Plaintiff-appellee Michael Baum ("Baum") designed and 
manufactured wearing apparel in New York City, New York, and 
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did business as Baumwear by Michael Baum from 1980 to 1982. 
(Tr. 11.) Since 1974, defendant-appellant Dean Knight 
("Knight") has done business as The Fashion Corner in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, as a wholesaler of manufactured apparel goods. 
(Tr. 55-56.) This action was commenced by Baum against Knight 
for an alleged breach by Knight of a contract by which Knight 
ordered certain apparel goods from Baum. After receiving the 
goods, Knight inspected them and rejected them because they did 
not conform to the representations made by the sales 
representative, Mark Grayson. 
Knight purchases apparel goods from numerous 
manufacturers. (Tr. 75.) Over 95 percent of his purchases are 
negotiated through sales or manufacturers representatives. One 
such sales representative who had represented manufacturers who 
had sold goods to Knight was Mark Grayson. (Tr. 58.) Knight 
testified that it is the usage of trade and standard practice 
in the wholesale apparel goods industry for goods to be 
returned by the buyer if, after receipt and inspection, the 
goods are not merchantable or as represented. In virtually all 
such cases when a rejection has been made and the buyer desires 
to return the goods, the buyer contacts the sales 
representative who thereupon makes the arrangements with the 
manufacturer for the goods to be returned. In his entire 
business experience as a wholesaler of apparel goods, Knight 
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has returned goods 50 to 75 times per year, which have always 
been accepted back by the manufacturer. (Tr. 76-78.) 
Knight was first contacted by Baum on or about October 
26, 1982 through Mark Grayson, who was acting as sales 
representative for Baum. Baum and Grayson had met at Baum's 
place of business in New York City. Grayson agreed to call 
Knight and to make an effort to sell Baum's goods to Knight. 
(Tr. 19-21, 59-62, 83-84.) Baum authorized Grayson to call 
Knight and to solicit Knight to purchase the goods. (Tr. 
39-40.) Baum agreed to pay Grayson a commission for his 
services of $1.00 per garment sold. (Tr. 37-39.) When Grayson 
first contacted Knight about Baumwear, he made certain 
representations about the style and quality of the clothing 
that Baum manufactured. For example, Grayson stated that the 
goods had the look of fashion designer Norma Keimali and that 
they were high fashioned fleece wear. (Tr. 44, 82.) Knight 
requested that Baum send samples of the clothing, but was told 
by Grayson that there was not enough time since Baum was going 
out of business. (Tr. 62, 83-84.) Based upon Grayson's 
representations concerning the clothing manufactured by Baum, 
Knight ordered the goods. (Tr. 62, 83-84.) 
Baum made appropriate credit checks and called Knight 
back to confirm the order. Although Knight did not intend to 
return the goods at the time he ordered them, it was part of 
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the agreement between the parties that if the goods were not as 
represented Knight would be entitled to reject them and return 
them to Baum. (Tr. 89-91.) This was consistent with the 
standard usage of trade under which goods purchased by 
wholesalers sight unseen can return them if they are not as 
represented or are unmerchantable. (Tr. 78, 90.) 
Prior to the time that Knight ordered the goods from 
Baum through Grayson, Knight had dealt with Grayson on a number 
of other occasions where Grayson represented other clothing 
manufacturers. Knight had rejected and returned goods on 
several such occasions when, after receipt and inspection, 
Knight determined that the goods were not as represented. In 
each such case Knight contacted Grayson who made the 
arrangements with the manufacturer for the goods to be 
returned. Knight's practice of contacting Grayson regarding 
the return of goods was consistent with the usage of trade. 
(Tr. 80-81, 96-97, 113.) 
Knight received the goods that he had ordered from 
Baum during the first two weeks of November, 1982. Immediately 
upon receiving the goods, Knight and his brother, David, 
inspected them and determined that the goods were not as had 
been represented and were not sellable. Specifically, the 
style was not a Norma Kamali or Betsy Johnson, as had been 
represented. Mark Grayson had also described the goods as a 
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"missy fleecy," which turned out not to be the case on 
defendant's inspection of the goods. Knight further made an 
aesthetic judgment regarding the merchantability of the goods, 
based upon his experience in the industry in this particular 
market area, and determined that the goods were not as 
represented and would have to be returned. (Tr. 64-65, 76, 
71-72, 84-85, 106-07.) 
Having made the determination to reject the goods, 
Knight communicated with Mark Grayson within the day or two of 
the receipt of the shipment. Knight told Grayson the goods 
were unacceptable and that he wanted to return them to Baum. 
Grayson indicated that Baum was out of business and had moved 
to up-state New York and requested that Knight cooperate in 
attempting to find another buyer for the goods on Baum's 
behalf. At Grayson's request, Knight sent samples of the goods 
to jobbers in Florida and California. Grayson's intent was 
apparently to attempt to sell the entire shipment of goods to 
one of the jobbers. (Tr. 66-68, 86, 97.) Had a sale been 
made, the sale would have been for Baum's benefit. (Tr. 97.) 
The goods were rejected by both the jobbers in California and 
in Florida. (Tr. 66-68, 86, 97.) Upon receiving notification 
of that fact, Knight had another conversation with Grayson in 
which Knight requested the address to which the goods should be 
sent. Grayson subsequently obtained the address and informed 
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Knight whereupon Knight returned the goods to the address 
given, which was in Ithaca, New York. (Tr. 98.) 
Prior to returning the goods, Knight had a telephone 
conversation with Baum on or about December 7, 1982, in which 
he informed Baum of his rejection of the goods. (Tr. 26-27, 
98.) Knight subsequently received a call from Baum's brother, 
Andrew, in which Knight stated again his dissatisfaction with 
the goods and his intent to return them. (Tr. 98-99.) 
Knight shipped the goods were shipped to Baum's 
address in Ithaca, New York, by Consolidated Freightways. Baum 
testified that he was given notice of the shipment by 
Consolidated Freightways, but that he refused to accept it. 
(Tr. 28.) The goods have since been liquidated by Consolidated 
Freightways for storage and freight charges. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Knight's notice to Baum was timely when given to 
Baum's agent, Mark Grayson, who was not only vested with actual 
authority by Baum to act as his agent but, consistent with the 
usage of trade, had apparent authority to receive Knight's 
notice of rejection. Knight justifiably rejected the goods 
since they did not conform to the contract. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
KNIGHT GAVE A VALID AND TIMELY 
NOTICE OF REJECTION. 
A. Knight gave timely notice of rejection. 
Following his inspection of the goods and 
determination that they were not as had been represented, and 
that they were unsellable, Knight immediately communicated with 
Baum's sales representative, Mark Grayson, and informed him 
that the goods were rejected and would be returned. Grayson 
requested Knight to send samples to two other jobbers in an 
attempt to market the goods. Knight followed that request as 
he was required to do under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-2-603(1), which requires a merchant buyer who has 
rejected goods "to follow any reasonable instructions received 
from the seller with respect to the goods." Had a sale 
resulted, it would have been for Baum's account. (Tr. 97.) 
Knight's notification of Grayson of the rejection of 
the nonconforming goods was timely under the provisions of the 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-602(a), 
which states: 
Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable 
time after their delivery or tender. It is 
ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies 
the seller. 
The UCC defines what is meant by the term "notifies," at Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(26), as follows: 
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A person "notifies" or "gives" a notice or 
notification to another by taking such steps as 
may be reasonably required to inform the other in 
ordinary course which or not such other actually 
comes to know of it. A person "receives" a 
notice or notification when 
(a) it comes to his attention; 
(b) it is duly delivered at the place of 
business through which the contract was 
made or at any other place held out by 
him as the place for receipt of such 
communications. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Section 70A-1-201(26) does not require that the seller 
receive actual notice. It is sufficient that the buyer take 
"such steps as may be reasonably required to inform" the 
seller. As argued below, the uncontroverted evidence at trial 
demonstrated that a wholesaler in the apparel industry who 
desires to reject a shipment does so by notifying the sales 
representative rather than the manufacturer. The sales 
representative thereafter makes arrangements with the 
manufacturer regarding the return of the goods. The lower 
court erred in not construing the oral contract between the 
parties as consistent with the usage of trade. By informing 
Grayson of the rejection of the goods, Knight did "notify" Baum 
within the meaning of sections 70A-1-201(26) and 70A-2-602(l). 
Grayson was BaunTs agent possessed of apparent, if not actual 
authority, to receive notice of Knight's rejection. 
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B. An agency relationship existed between Baum and Mark 
Grayson. 
The lower court found that "Grayson was not an 
employee or agent of the plaintiff but, in fact, a freelancer 
representative who, in this case, was more allied with the 
defendant than the plaintiff . . . and that Grayson had no 
authority to bind the plaintiff." (R. 190-91.) This finding, 
however, is not supported by the evidence or the law. The Utah 
Supreme Court, in the case of Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 370, 1384 P.2d 796 (1963), defined agency, 
following the Restatement (Second) of Agency, as follows: 
Agency is the fiduciary relation which results 
from the manifestation of consent by one person 
to another that the other shall act on his behalf 
and subject to his control, and consent by the 
other so to act. 
Id. at 800 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 
(1958)). See Mountain States Moving & Storage Co. v. Suhr 
Transport, Inc., 29 Utah 2d 295, 508 P.2d 812, 814 (1973) 
(court identified the standard in the Continental Bank case as 
the "traditional concept of agency"). 
Thus, where the principal intends that the agent shall 
act for him and where the agent intends to accept the authority 
and to act pursuant to the authority on behalf of the 
principal, they have mutually consented to the creation of an 
agency relationship. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Stevens, 16 
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Utah 2d 424, 403 P.2d 31, 32 (1965). Mutual consent may be 
either express or implied. 
The uncontroverted evidence in the present case 
demonstrated that Baum and Grayson entered into an oral 
agreement that Grayson act on Baum's behalf in locating a buyer 
for Baum's goods and in negotiating the terms of the sale. 
According to Baum's testimony, he agreed to pay Grayson a 
commission of $1.00 per garment, in return for which Grayson 
agreed to find a buyer and to arrange the sale of Baum?s 
goods. (Tr. 37-39.) With the exception of details regarding 
price, the negotiations regarding the sale were between Grayson 
and Knight. (Tr. 83.) Baum admitted at the trial that he 
authorized Grayson to call Knight from Baum's place of business 
in New York City. (Tr. 39-40.) Grayson was thus an agent by 
actual authority to represent Baum in the transaction and, 
being so, was authorized to receive notice of Knight's 
rejection of the goods. That notice was seasonable since it 
was given within a day of receipt of the goods. The lower 
court erred in holding that Knight's notice of rejection to 
Grayson was ineffective. 
The evidence also supports the implication of an 
agency relationship between Baum and Grayson. The existence of 
implied consent may be proved by deductions or inferences from 
the facts and circumstances of the particular situation, 
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including the words and conduct, of the parties. See Forsyth 
v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, 360-61 (Utah 1980) (Court upheld 
finding of implied agency between party and her attorney based 
on evidence that the attorney had been earlier involved in 
executing the contract at issue and that the party had 
forwarded to the attorney a letter pertaining to the default 
under the contract to the attorney). 
Mark Grayson's deposition was introduced in its 
entirety as evidence at the trial. (Exhibit 7-P.) In his 
deposition, Grayson testified that he was a sales 
representative and that he had a "representative relationship11 
with fifty or sixty manufacturers. (Grayson Deposition, at 
7-10.) Grayson testified that he was initially contacted by 
Baum in response to one of Grayson's advertisements in a trade 
publication. (Grayson Deposition, at 19.) Grayson thereafter 
met with Baum at his place of business, examined the goods, and 
stated that he thought Knight might be interested in purchasing 
them. Grayson thereupon made a telephone call to Knight. Baum 
testified at the trial that he was present during the 
conversation and was able to hear what Grayson said and that he 
did not object to Grayson's actions. (Tr. 40, 44.) Grayson 
testified that Knight agreed to accept the merchandise and 
order the goods while speaking with Grayson on the telephone 
and before Baum ever spoke with Knight. (Grayson Deposition, 
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at 26-27.) Knight similarly testified that he determined to 
buy the goods based on his conversation with Grayson. (Tr. 
83-84.) Grayson testified further that Baum agreed to 
compensate him for his services by paying "eight percent or one 
dollar per garment when he was paid by Fashion Corner." 
(Grayson Deposition, at 36.) The next question and answer in 
the Grayson deposition indicate that Baum had in fact 
authorized Grayson to perform the services on Baum's behalf in 
soliciting Knight to purchase the goods and in preparing the 
purchase order: 
Q. Did Mr. Baum give you any authority to do 
anything for him in connection with any deal 
other than this particular sale to Fashion Corner? 
A. No. 
(Grayson Deposition, at 36.) 
Grayson's relationship to Baum as an agent was 
clarified in the following testimony by Grayson: 
Q. Let me make it more specific. Again, 
this is in terms of the industry. Would you 
characterize the relation as, you were acting as 
a broker for Mr. Baum, or agent? 
A. I was a sales rep, a sales 
representative for Mr. Baum. 
Q. In connection with being a sales 
representative, generally, what sorts of powers 
do you generally have? 
A. Calling up potential customers who could 
perhaps use some of the merchandise owned by the 
company who wants me to sell for them, or who I 
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approach to sell for them and they agree that I 
perhaps can do some business for them. 
Q. Do you or do you not have authority to 
bind the manufacturer to a contract? 
A. I have no authority to do that. 
Q. Everything must ultimately be approved 
by the manufacturer? 
A. They approve the credit and the prices 
and the general order that goes out. 
Q. And your role is basically to negotiate 
with the prospective buyer? 
A. I would say my role is generally to 
describe the merchandise to the prospective buyer 
and discuss prices, original prices, current 
prices, where I think the merchandise fits into 
the configuration of the merchandising concept of 
the particular store or retail chain. 
(Grayson Deposition, 66-67.) 
The evidence was uncontroverted that Grayson was 
Baum's sales representative and that, acting in that capacity 
and in consideration of the commission that Baum agreed to pay 
him, Grayson located a buyer, Dean Knight, and negotiated the 
transaction with him. Since he was thus authorized to deal 
with Knight on behalf of Baum, this Court must hold that the 
lower court's finding that Grayson was not Baum's agent was 
erroneous and not supported by the evidence. 
C. Mark Grayson had apparent authority from Baum to 
receive notice of rejection of the goods. 
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Apparent authority is that which, though not actually 
granted, the principal permits the agent to exercise or on 
which third persons are entitled to rely based upon the acts of 
the principal. Mailia v. Giles, 100 Utah 562, 114 P.2d 208, 
211 (1941). See Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal.2d 412, 
159 P.2d 958, 979 (1945) (The essential elements of apparent or 
ostensible authority are representation by the principal, 
justifiable reliance thereon by the third party, and change of 
position or injury resulting from such reliance). Apparent 
authority must be determined from the facts and circumstances 
of the transaction. United States Bond and Finance Corp. v. 
National Building and Loan Association, 80 Utah 62, 12 P.2d 
758, 760 (1932). 
The lower court ignored the issue whether Grayson had 
apparent authority to receive notice of rejection of the 
goods. The evidence was clear that Grayson had apparent 
authority from Baum to receive notice of the rejection of goods 
based on Baum's manifestation to Knight that Grayson had 
authority to act on Baum's behalf. This manifestation was 
given by Baum to Knight in the two telephone conversations 
between them prior to the shipment of the goods in which Baum 
confirmed or ratified the negotiations that Grayson had had 
with Knight regarding the sale of the goods. Baum made no 
objection to the statements made by Grayson. (Tr. 40-46.) 
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Knight acted in good faith, had reason to believe, and did 
actually believe that Grayson possessed authority from 
plaintiff. Relying on the appearance of authority in Grayson, 
Knight continued to deal with Grayson regarding the rejection 
and return of the goods. The facts of the present case raise 
an estoppel against Baum to deny that Grayson had authority 
from him to deal with Knight regarding the rejection and return 
of the goods. This is particularly so in light of the evidence 
that it was the standard practice in the industry for a buyer, 
such as Knight, to notify the sales representative, rather than 
the manufacturer, of the rejection of goods purchased. Knight 
did exactly what he had always done in rejecting goods in 
hundreds of transactions. He contacted the sales 
representative. 
D. The lower court erred in not considering the usage of 
trade under which wholesale buyers communicate with 
the sales representative in giving notice of 
rejection. 
The lower court held that Knight's notice of rejection 
to Grayson was not valid since Grayson was not Baum's agent. 
In so ruling, the court refused to consider the relevant usage 
of trade, which, according to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, 
should be considered in construing a sale's contract between 
merchants. The UCC, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-205 states: 
(3) A course of dealing between parties and any usage 
of trade in the vocation or trade in which they 
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are engaged or which they should be aware give 
particular meaning to and supplement or qualify 
terms of an agreement. 
(4) The express terms of an agreement and an 
applicable course of dealing or usage of trade 
shall be construed wherever reasonable as 
consistent with each other; but when such 
construction is unreasonable express terms 
control both the course of dealing and usage of 
trade and course of dealing controls usage of 
trade. 
(Emphasis added). 
An agent's apparent authority must thus also be seen 
in light of the standard practices of the trade. The 
commentators in Restatement (Second) of Agency § 49, comment 
c, state: 
Inferences from agentys position. 
Acts are interpreted in the light of 
ordinary human experience. If a principal 
puts an agent into, or knowingly permits him 
to occupy, a position in which according to 
the ordinary habits of persons in the 
locality, trade or profession, it is usual 
for such an agent to have a particular kind 
of authority, any one dealing with him is 
justified in inferring that he has such 
authority in the absence of reason to know 
otherwise. The content of such apparent 
authority is a matter to be determined from 
the facts. 
"Usage of trade" is defined by the UCC as "any practice or 
method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a 
place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it 
will be observed with respect to the transaction in question. 
The existence and scope of such a usage are to be proved as 
facts." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-205(2). See also Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-2-208(2) (express terms of an agreement, course of 
performance, and usage of trade shall be construed whenever 
reasonable as consistent with each other). 
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(Emphasis added). 
The present case falls precisely within the purview of 
the foregoing comment from the Restatement. Baum retained 
Grayson as his representative, agreeing to pay him a 
commission, and allowed him to deal with Knight in negotiating 
a sale of the goods. This was the customary function of a 
sales representative in the wholesale apparel goods industry. 
(Tr. 58.) The evidence was uncontroverted that it is also the 
function of a sale representative in the industry to receive 
notice of a rejection of goods by a buyer and to make 
arrangements with the manufacturer for their return. (Tr. 
76-77.) That being the case, Knight was entitled to infer that 
Grayson had authority to accept notice of rejection in the 
absence of any reason to know otherwise. 
In the case of Vickers v. North American Land 
Developments, Inc., 94 N.M. 65, 607 P.2d 603 (1980), the court 
considered a suit by a purchaser seeking specific performance 
of a land sales contract which they claimed they had entered 
into with the agent of the seller. The seller denied that the 
alleged agent had any authority to enter into the contract. 
The court held that, while the agent lacked actual authority to 
buy the seller, he did have apparent authority, having been 
placed in a position by the principal "which would lead a 
reasonably prudent person to believe that the agent did indeed 
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possess that apparent authority." Id. at 605. The court 
relied on Restatement (First) of Agency § 49, comment b, which 
was substantially identical to comment c of the Second 
Restatement quoted above, and held that the agent was 
possessed of apparent authority which the principal was 
estopped to deny. Id. at 605. 
The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 34 suggests 
circumstances to be considered in interpreting an 
authorization, including "the general usages of business, the 
usages of trades or employments of the kind to which the 
authorization relates, and the business methods of the 
principal." Id. § 34(b) (emphasis added). Section 36 of the 
Second Restatement provides further that, unless otherwise 
agreed, "an agent is authorized to comply with the relevant 
usages of business if the principal has notice that usages of 
such nature may exist." Notice to Baum of the relevant usage 
of trade may be inferred, according to comment c: 
A person carrying on business has reason to know, 
and hence has notice of, the usages of the place 
in which he does business with respect to the 
type of business he conducts. If both principal 
and agent are in the same locality and are 
engaged in the same kind of business, it is 
inferred that the authorization is to act in 
accordance with such usages. 
Mark Grayson's dealings with Baum and with Knight must 
not be viewed in a vacuum. Knight had previously rejected and 
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returned the goods in hundreds of purchase transactions, (Tr. 
76), including many in which Grayson had acted as the sales 
representative of the manufacturers. (Tr. 97.) In nearly 
every such instance, Knight communicated with the sales 
representative when giving notice of the rejection rather than 
the manufacturer. (Tr. 76-77.) Knight's practice was 
consistent with the standard practice in the industry. (Tr. 
76.) Consistent with that usage of trade, Knight testified, 
Grayson was to take care of all of the arrangements to have the 
goods returned, as he had in the past on every one of the 
thirty or so occasions when he had represented manufacturers 
who had sold to Knight. (Tr. 80-81.) 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-205(3), the usage 
of trade gives "particular meaning to and supplements or 
qualifies" the terms of the agreement between Baum and Knight. 
By authorizing Mark Grayson, as a sales representative, to 
contact Knight and to negotiate the sale, Baum thereby put 
Grayson in a position of apparent authority upon which Knight 
justifiably relied in giving notice of the rejection. Knight 
acted as he had in the vast majority of situations where he had 
determined to return goods --he gave notice to the sales 
representative. That notice was effective and seasonable under 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-602(l) and the lower court erred in not 
so finding. 
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Moreoever, the usage of trade must be construed as 
consistent with the oral agreement between the parties if at 
all possible, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-l-205(4) and 
70A-2-208(2). Because the usage of trade recognizes that sales 
representatives have authority to receive notice of rejection, 
(Tr. 76), construction of the oral agreement in this case 
consistent with that usage must result in a finding of 
apparent, if not actual, authority by Baum to Grayson to 
continue to act on his behalf insofar as necessary to receive 
the notice of rejection from Knight. 
E. Grayson was not Knight's agent. 
The lower court, while it did not specifically find 
that Grayson was Knight's agent, found that Grayson was "more 
closely allied with the defendant." (R. 198.) Although the 
effect of this finding is not apparent in the record, it is 
contrary to the uncontroverted evidence. As shown in subpart B 
above, Grayson's relationship was with Baum. Grayson was to 
receive his compensation from Baum and it was on Baum's behalf 
that Grayson contacted Knight and arranged the sale of the 
goods. Grayson represented many manufacturers in selling goods 
to numerous buyers including Knight. Grayson's conduct in 
contacting Knight and negotiating the sale of goods to him from 
Baum's place of business does not meet the elements necessary 
to establish an agency relationship. Grayson himself testified 
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he was Baum's representative. (Grayson Deposition, at 66-67.) 
Although Grayson signed Baum's purchase order, as buyer, there 
was no evidence that he was authorized by Knight to sign. The 
lower court's finding that the purchase order was "signed by 
Mark Grayson for the defendant," (R-197) was unsupported by any 
evidence. Knight testified that he had never authorized 
Grayson to sign any purchase order. (Tr. 81, 91.) There was 
certainly no mutual consent between Knight and Grayson that 
Grayson act as Knight's agent, nor did Knight exercise any 
degree of control over Grayson's activities. To the contrary, 
Knight testified that he followed Grayson's directions 
concerning the disposal of the goods after the rejection. (Tr. 
97.) Again, this was consistent with the standard practice in 
the industry, and the lower court committed error in not so 
construing the contract between the parties. 
F. In the alternative, Knight's notice to Baum 
personally was sufficient. 
Even if Knight's notice of rejection to Mark Grayson 
was inadequate, Knight argues in the alternative that the 
requirements of Section 70A-2-602(l) were satisfied when Knight 
spoke with Baum on the telephone on or about December 7, 1982. 
It is undisputed that Knight personally told Baum at that time 
that he was rejecting the goods. Shortly after, Knight also 
told Baum's brother, an attorney, the same thing. (Tr. 
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101-02.) Those communications were sufficient to satisfy the 
notice requirements of section 70A-2-602(l), which requires 
only that the notice be "seasonable." Section 70A-1-204 states: 
(2) What is a reasonable time for taking any 
action depends on the nature, purpose and 
circumstances of such action. 
(3) An action is taken "seasonably" when it is 
taken at or within the time agreed or if no 
time is agreed at or within a reasonable 
time. 
Thus, Knight notified Baum "seasonably" because the 
notice was given within a reasonable time. Again, the oral 
agreement between the parties must be construed as consistent 
with the usage of trade, under Sections 70A-1-205(3), (4) and 
70A-2-208(2). Knight acted consistent with the usage of trade 
in giving notice to Baum personally in their telephone 
conversation of December 7, 1982, particularly in light of his 
efforts to contact Baum through Grayson. The UCC does not 
require that a buyer return rejected goods within a reasonable 
time, only that he notify the seller within a reasonable 
time. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-602(l). According to the 
uncontroverted evidence, whenever Knight returned goods he 
purchased from Grayson, it sometimes would be more than a month 
before the goods would be shipped back. (Tr. 81.) If the 
notice requirement was not satisfied by Knight's communication 
with Mark Grayson it was certainly satisfied when he spoke with 
Baum personally on or about December 7, 1982. 
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II. 
KNIGHT'S REJECTION OF THE GOODS WAS VALID AND 
JUSTIFIED UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. 
As demonstrated at trial, Knight was justified in 
rejecting the apparel goods that he had ordered from Baum. A 
buyer's right to reject goods is governed by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-2-601 (1981), which provides: 
Buyer's rights on improper delivery. 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter on 
breach in installment contracts (section 
70A-2-612) and unless otherwise agreed under the 
sections on contractual limitations of remedy 
(sections 70A-2-718 and 701A-2-719), if the goods 
or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to 
conform to the contract, the buyer may 
(a) reject the whole; or 
(b) accept the whole; or 
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and 
reject the rest. 
(Emphasis added.) 
By allowing a rejection of the whole shipment if the 
tender of delivery fails "in any respect to conform to the 
contract," Section 70A-2-601 codifies the "perfect tender rule" 
applied by the courts prior to the adoption of the UCC. See 
Moulton Cavity & Mold, Inc. v. Lyn-flex Industries, Inc., 396 
A.2d 1024, 1027 (Me. 1979) (UCC § 2-601 represents a 
continuation of the perfect tender rule). As the court in 
Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. Conley, 372 So. 2d 965 
(Fla. App. 1979), stated: 
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The statutory scheme leaves no doubt that, 
when non-conforming tender is delivered, it is 
the buyer's choice whether to reject the goods 
and cause a recission [sic] of the contract, 
suing for their purchase price, or whether to 
accept the goods and receive . . . damages for 
breach of warranty . . . . 
Id. at 969. 
Defendant Dean Knight and his brother, David Knight, 
each testified that the goods ordered from Baum did not conform 
to the agreement; were not as represented; and were generally 
not merchantable in their market area. 
After inspecting Baum's apparel goods, Mark Grayson 
called Knight on the telephone and described the goods to him. 
In his description, Grayson identified the goods with the 
styles of fashion designer Norma Kamali. Knight testified as 
follows regarding Gray's representations concerning the goods: 
Q. Now, you have already testified today 
about your first conversation with Mark Grayson, 
but I would like to ask you if you can to tell me 
everything that you remember Mark Grayson saying 
to you about these particular goods that were 
being sold by Baumwear. 
A. Well, as I remember, he called me from 
Baumwear and said they were a Norma Kamali look, 
that they were quite high fashioned fleece 
goods. There was a good breakdown, that the 
sizes were good and there weren't many of them. 
He did say it was quite a bit off the normal 
wholesale price. I don't know if 70 percent was 
ever mentioned, and I don't know if it is 70 
percent off. He did mention there was quite a 
discount. 
0. I think v ou used the term "fleece." 
Can you tell me what that means? 
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A. "Fleece wear" is basically a material 
and at that particular point in time, Norma 
Kamali was dealing quite a bit in these goods 
with ruffles, and so forth and so on, and that is 
what we pictured and envisioned the goods to be. 
Q. Did you use the term "breakdown" also? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What does that mean? 
A. I thought the breakdown was going to be 
a certain number of tops, with a certain number 
of bottoms, and that was going to be, if not 
perfect, good. 
Q. Do you remember whether he said it was 
perfect or good? 
A. I don't. I think he said it was a good 
breakdown. 
(Tr. 81-82.) 
Knight's testimony was uncontroverted. Baum admitted 
that Grayson described the goods as being like the style of 
Norma Kamali. (Tr. 44.) 
Knight testified that it is the standard practice in 
the wholesale apparel industry for wholesalers who purchase 
goods sight unseen to be able to return the goods if they are 
unsatisfactory. (Tr. 90.) In his first conversation with 
Grayson, Knight stated he would keep the goods if they were as 
represented. (Tr. 89.) Knight testified that the practice in 
the industry is to protect the buyer because, as he stated, 
"[m]ost of the salesmen always have floating terms, and my 
perception is not always what their perception is. And so, 
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consequently, when the goods arrive they are totally different 
than what we had thought they would be. And so we call up and 
express that fact and return them." (Tr. 78-79.) David 
Knight, defendant's partner, testified that it is normal to 
return goods that are aesthetically unsatisfactory. (Tr. 113.) 
The lower court found that "the goods were not 
defective but that defendant simply did not like the aesthetics 
of the goods when they arrived." (R. 198.) This finding, 
while consistent with the evidence, underplays the importance 
of aesthetics in the apparel market. Consumers only buy what 
is aesthetically pleasing. Hence the importance to a 
wholesaler such as Knight to be able to purchase goods that are 
attractive from an aesthetic point of view. Knight purchased 
Baum's goods sight unseen based on Grayson's representations. 
Knight inspected the goods after receiving them and found them 
not to be as represented. The goods did not look like Norma 
Kamalifs style, and could not have been marketed in the area in 
which Knight sells apparel goods. (Tr. 64-65, 71-72, 85, 
106-107.) Knight would have sold the goods ordered from Baum 
to small stores mainly in the Rocky Mountain States. (Tr. 
74-75.) David Knight testified that because of the lack of 
aesthetic value of the goods 
they would be very difficult to market, if they 
were marketable at all, particularly in the area 
that we sell . . . I think that when you purchase 
over the years, and I have been a buyer for a 
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number of years, I just think some things are 
instinctive and I felt that they were ugly, when 
I say 'poor esthetic [sic] value.' I thought, 
personally, we would have a very, very difficult 
time in marketing. I thought they were very 
forward fashions. They would be very difficult 
to market in our area, if at all possible. 
(Tr. 106-07.) 
Baum's representations concerning the goods, made 
through his sales representative, Mark Grayson, constituted 
express warranties about the goods within the meaning of Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-2-313(1). The goods were further subject to 
implied warranties of merchantability, under Section 70A-2-314, 
which states: 
(1) Unless excluded or modified (section 
70A-2-316), a warranty that the goods shall 
be merchantable is implied in a contract for 
their sale if the seller is a merchant with 
respect to goods of that kind. 
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least 
such as 
(a) pass without objection in the trade 
under the contract description; 
(3) Unless excluded or modified (section 
70A-2-316) other implied warranties may 
arise from course of dealing or usage of 
trade. 
The evidence was virtually undisputed that the goods 
did not conform to the representations and generally were not 
saleable. Baum thus breached the express and implied 
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warranties as to the quality of the goods, and defendant was 
entitled to reject. 
III. 
BAUM FAILED TO MITIGATE HIS DAMAGES 
Following presentation of Baum's case, Knight moved 
the Court to dismiss the action for failure of Baum to prove 
any specific damages. (Tr. 94-95) which the Court erroneously 
denied. The remedies available to a seller were "the buyer 
wrongfully rejects" are generally itemized in Utah Code Ann. § 
70A-2-703. If the court determines that Knight wrongfully 
rejected in this case, then Baum must look to the remedies 
enumerated in that section. Although Baum did not specifically 
elect which remedy he intended to pursue, his argument at the 
trial suggested his reliance on Section 70A-2-706 (damages for 
nonacceptance) or Section 70A-2-709 (action for the price). 
The other remedies listed in section 70A-2-703 are 
inapplicable under the facts of this case. They provide that a 
seller may: 
(a) withhold delivery of such goods; 
(b) stop delivery by any bailee as hereafter provided 
(section 70A-2-705); 
(c) proceed under the next section respecting goods 
still unidentified to the contract; 
. . . . 
(f) cancel. 
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Under either section Baum had a duty to mitigate his damages by 
selling the goods or by subtracting the market value of the 
goods from the contract price. Baum did not meet this duty. 
Rather, he testified that when the goods were returned to him 
he refused to accept delivery from the carrier. (Tr. 28.) The 
goods were subsequently sold by the carrier to cover its 
costs. Baum failed to introduce evidence of the market value 
of the goods, and the lower court erred in not holding that 
Baum failed to meet his burden of proving damages. The seller 
has the burden of proving his damages by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 4 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-708:15 
(3d ed. 1983). 
A. Damages for nonacceptance or repudiation. 
Section 70A-2-708 provides for seller's damages for 
nonacceptance or repudiation, as follows: 
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and to the 
provisions of this chapter with respect to 
proof of market price (section 70A-2-723), 
the measure of damages for nonacceptance or 
repudiation by the buyer is the difference 
between the market price at the time and 
place for tender and the unpaid contract 
price together with any incidental damages 
provided in this chapter (section 
70A-2-710), but less expenses saved in 
consequence of the buyer's breach. 
(2) If the measure of damages provided in 
subsection (1) is inadequate to put the 
seller in as good a position as performance 
would have done then the measure of damages 
is the profit (including reasonable 
overhead) which the seller would have made 
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from full performance by the buyer, together 
with any incidental damages provided in this 
chapter (section 70A-2-710), due allowance 
for costs reasonably incurred and due credit 
for payments or proceeds of resale. 
(Emphas is added.) 
Baum is precluded from recovering damages under this 
section because he failed to put on evidence of the market 
price of the goods in November of 1982. There is no evidence 
in the record that the formula in subparagraph (1) would not 
put plaintiff in as good a position as performance. "When lost 
profits are awarded, it is necessary that the record show why 
the contract price-market price formula was not appropriate." 
4 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-708:21. 
The "lost profits" provisions of subparagraph (2) of 
section 70A-2-708 are inapplicable in the present case. That 
section was intended to compensate a seller such as a dealer or 
volume seller who, even though he has been able to resell the 
goods, has suffered a loss of profit because the person to whom 
he resold the goods would have bought the item in any event. 
Thus, the seller obtained only one sale when he could have had 
two. See 4 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-708:21; 
J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 226 (1972). 
Because Baum has failed to prove the elements of 
damages, including market value of the goods, he cannot recover 
under section 70A-2-708. That section contemplates a 
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mitigation of damages by the seller--which Baum failed to do 
when he allowed the goods to be liquidated by the carrier 
rather than to accept delivery and resell them. 
B. Action for the price. 
Section 70A-2-709 provides by the seller of the price, 
as follows: 
(1) When the buyer fails to pay the price as it 
becomes due the seller may recover, together 
with any incidental damages under the next 
section, the price 
(a) of goods accepted or of conforming 
goods lost or damaged within a 
commercially reasonable time after risk 
of their loss has passed to the buyer; 
and 
(b) of goods identified to the contract if 
the seller is unable after reasonable 
effort to resell them at a reasonable 
price or the circumstances reasonably 
indicate that such effort will be 
unavailing. 
(2) Where the seller sues for the price he must 
hold for the buyer any goods which have been 
identified to the contract and are still in 
his control except that if resale becomes 
possible he may resell them at amy time 
prior to the collection of the judgment. 
The net proceeds of any such resale must be 
credited to the buyer and payment of the 
judgment entitles him to any goods not 
resold. 
(3) After the buyer has wrongfully rejected or 
revoked acceptance of the goods or has 
failed to make a payment due or has 
repudiated (section 70A-2-610), a seller who 
is held not entitled to the price under this 
section shall nevertheless be awarded 
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damages for nonacceptance under the 
preceding section, 
(Emphas is added.) 
This section appears to be inappropriate in the 
present case in governing the measure of damages. It allows a 
seller to recover the price of the goods if the goods were 
accepted, lost, or damaged, or if the seller has not been able 
to resell at a "reasonable price or the circumstances 
reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing." In 
the present case the evidence showed that defendant did not 
3 
"accept" the goods. He rejected them and returned them to 
Baum, who allowed them to be liquidated. Therefore, Baum's 
claims for the price must fail, not having satisfied the 
requirements of Section 70A-2-709. 
CONCLUSION 
Knight urges this Court to hold in his favor and to 
reverse the judgment of the lower court on the basis that he 
justifiably rejected the goods shipped by Baum and gave 
effective notice thereof to Baum by communicating both with 
Mark Grayson and with Baum himself within a reasonable time 
after receipt of the goods. Knight's rejection and motive was 
"Acceptance" is a term of art under the UCC, and is 
defined in section 70A-2-606, and includes situations where the 
buyer "fails to make an effective rejection." Defendant did 
not "accept" the goods, having made an effective rejection. 
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consistent with the usage of trade. Even if the Court upholds 
the finding that Knight's rejection was wrongful, the lower 
court must be reversed because Baum failed to put on evidence 
as to damages. Baum refused to receive the goods back and so 
failed to mitigate his damages by allowing them to be 
liquidated. 
ADDENDUM 
The following statutes from the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code are relevant to the issues in this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(26): 
(26) A person "notifies" or "gives" a 
notice or notification to another by taking such 
steps as may be reasonably required to inform the 
other in ordinary course whether or not such 
other actually comes to know of it. A person 
"receives" a notice or notification when 
(a) it comes to his attention; or 
(b) it is duly delivered at the place of 
business through which the contract was made or 
at any other place held out by him as the place 
for receipt of such communications. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-l-204(2), (3): 
(2) What is a reasonable time for taking 
any action depends on the nature, purpose and 
circumstance of such action. 
(3) An action is taken "seasonably" when it 
is taken at or within the time agreed or if no 
time is agreed at or within a reasonable time. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 70A-l-205(3): 
(3) A course of dealing between parties and any 
usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which they 
are engaged or of which they are or should be aware 
give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify 
terms of an agreement. 
(4) The express terms of an agreement and an 
applicable course of dealing or usage of trade shall 
be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with 
each other; but when such construction is unreasonable 
express terms control both course of dealing and usage 
of trade and course of dealing controls usage of trade. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-208(2): 
(2) The express terms of the agreement and any 
such course of performance, as well as any course of 
dealing and usage of trade, shall be construed 
whenever reasonable as consistent with each other; but 
when such construction is unreasonable, express terms 
shall control course of performance and course of 
performance shall control both course of dealing and 
usage of trade (section 70A-1-205). 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-313(l): 
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created 
as follows: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by 
the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and 
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an 
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the 
affirmation or promise. 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made 
part of the basis of the bargain creates an express 
warranty that the goods shall conform to the 
description. 
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of 
the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty 
that the whole of the goods shall conform to the 
sample or model. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-314: 
(1) Unless excluded or modified (section 
70A-2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be 
merchantable is implied in a contract for their 
sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to 
goods of that kind. Under this section the 
servicing for value of food or drink to be 
consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a 
sale. 
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at 
least such as 
(a) pass without objection in the 
trade under the contract description; and 
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are 
of fair average quality within the description; 
and 
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes 
for which such goods are used; and 
(d) run, within the variations 
permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality 
and quantity within each unit and among all units 
involved; and 
(e) are adequately contained, 
packaged, and labeled as the agreement may 
require; and 
(f) conform to the promises or 
affirmations of fact made on the container or 
label if any. 
(3) Unless excluded or modified (section 
70A-2-316) other implied warranties may arise 
from course of dealing or usage of trade. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-601: 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter on 
breach in installment contracts (section 
70A-2-612) and unless otherwise agreed under the 
sections on contractual limitations of remedy 
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(sections 70A-2-718 and 70A-2-719), if the goods 
or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to 
conform to the contract, the buyer may 
(a) reject the whole; or 
(b) accept the whole; or 
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and 
reject the rest. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-602: 
(1) Rejection of goods must be within a 
reasonable time after their delivery or tender. 
It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably 
notifies the seller. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of the two 
following sections on rejected goods (sections 
70A-2-603 and 70A-2-604). 
(a) after rejection any exercise of 
ownership by the buyer, with respect to any 
commercial unit is wrongful as against the 
seller; and 
(b) if the buyer has before rejection 
taken physical possession of goods in which he 
does not have a security interest under the 
provisions of this chapter (subsection (3) of 
section 70A-2-711), he is under a duty after 
rejection to hold them with reasonable care at 
the seller's disposition for a time sufficient to 
permit the seller to remove them but 
(c) the buyer has no further 
obligations with regard to goods rightfully 
rejected. 
(3) The seller's rights with respect to 
goods wrongfully rejected are governed by the 
provisions of this chapter on seller's remedies 
in general (section 70A-2-703). 
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Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-603: 
(1) Subject to any security interest in the 
buyer (subsection (3) of section 70A-2-711), when 
the seller has no agent or place of business at 
the market of rejection a merchant buyer is under 
a duty after rejection of goods in his possession 
or control to follow any reasonable instructions 
received from the seller with respect to the 
goods and in the absence of such instructions to 
make reasonable effort to sell them for the 
seller's account if they are perishable or 
threaten to decline in value speedily. 
Instructions are not reasonable if on demand 
indemnity for expenses is not forthcoming. 
(2) When the buyer sells goods under 
subsection (1), he is entitled to reimbursement 
from the seller or out of the proceeds for 
reasonable expenses of caring for and selling 
them, and if the expenses include no selling 
commission then to such commission as is usual in 
the trade or if there is none to a reasonable sum 
not exceeding ten percent on the gross proceeds. 
(3) In complying with this section the 
buyer is held only to good faith and good faith 
conduct hereunder is neither acceptance nor 
conversion nor the basis of action for damages. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-703: 
Where the buyer wrongfully rejects or 
revokes acceptance of goods or fails to make a 
payment due on or before delivery or repudiates 
with respect to a part or the whole, then with 
respect to any goods directly affected and, if 
the breach is of the whole contract (section 
70A-2-612), then also with respect to the whole 
undelivered balance, the aggrieved seller may 
(a) withhold delivery of such goods; 
(b) stop delivery by any bailee as 
hereafter provided (section 70A-2-705); 
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(c) proceed under the next section 
respecting goods still unidentified to the 
contract; 
(d) resell and recover damages as hereafter 
provided (section 70A-2-706); 
(e) recover damages for nonacceptance 
(section 70A-2-708) or in a proper case the price 
(section 70A-2-709); 
(f) cancel. 
Utah Code Ann § 70A-2-706: 
(1) Under the conditions stated in section 
70A-2-703 on seller's remedies, the seller may 
resell the goods concerned or the undelivered 
balance thereof. Where the resale is made in 
good faith and in a commercially reasonable 
manner the seller may recover the difference 
between the resale price and the contract price 
together with any incidental damages allowed 
under the provisions of this chapter (section 
70A-2-710), but less expenses saved in 
consequence of the buyer's breach. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in 
subsection (3) or unless otherwise agreed resale 
may be at public or private sale including sale 
by way of one or more contracts to sell or of 
identification to an existing contract of the 
seller. Sale may be as a unit or in parcels and 
at any time and place and on any terms but every 
aspect of the sale including the method, manner, 
time, place and terms must be commercially 
reasonable. The resale must be reasonably 
identified as referring to the broken contract, 
but it is not necessary that the goods be in 
existence or that any or all of them have been 
identified to the contract before the breach. 
(3) Where the resale is at private sale the 
seller must give the buyer reasonable 
notification of his intention to resell. 
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(4) Where the resale is at public sale 
(a) only identified goods can be sold 
except where there is a recognized market for a 
public sale of futures in goods of the kind; and 
(b) it must be made at a usual place 
or market for public sale if one is reasonably 
available and except in the case of goods which 
are perishable or threaten to decline in value 
speedily the seller must give the buyer 
reasonable notice of the time and place of the 
resale; and 
(c) if the goods are not to be within 
the view of those attending the sale the 
notification of sale must state the place where 
the goods are located and provide for their 
reasonable inspection by prospective bidders; and 
(d) the seller may buy. 
(5) A purchaser who buys in good faith at a 
resale takes the goods free of any rights of the 
original buyer even though the seller fails to 
comply with one or more of the requirements of 
this section. 
(6) The seller is not accountable to the 
buyer for any profit made on any resale. A 
person in the position of a seller (section 
70A-2-707) or a buyer who has rightfully rejected 
or justifiably revoked acceptance must account 
for any excess over the amount of his security 
interest, as hereinafter defined (subsection (3) 
of section 70A-2-711). 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-708: 
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and to the 
provisions of this chapter with respect to proof 
of market price (section 70A-2-723), the measure 
of damages for nonacceptance or repudiation by 
the buyer is the difference between the market 
price at the time and place for tender and the 
unpaid contract price together with any 
incidental damages provided in this chapter 
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(section 70A-2-710), but less expenses saved in 
consequence of the buyer's breach. 
(2) If the measure of damages provided in 
subsection (1) is inadequate to put the seller in 
as good a position as performance would have done 
then the measure of damages is the profit 
(including reasonable overhead) which the seller 
would have made from full performance by the 
buyer, together with any incidental damages 
provided in this chapter (section 70A-2-710), due 
allowance for costs reasonably incurred and due 
credit for payments or proceeds of resale. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-709: 
(1) When the buyer fails to pay the price 
as it becomes due the seller may recover, 
together with any incidental damages under the 
next section, the price 
(a) of goods accepted or of conforming 
goods lost or damaged within a commercially 
reasonable time after risk of their loss has 
passed to the buyer; and 
(b) of goods identified to the 
contract if the seller is unable after reasonable 
effort to resell them at a reasonable price or 
the circumstances reasonably indicate that such 
effort will be unavailing. 
(2) Where the seller sues for the price he 
must hold for the buyer any goods which have been 
identified to the contract and are still in his 
control except that if resale becomes possible he 
may resell them at any time prior to the 
collection of the judgment. The net proceeds of 
any such resale must be credited to the buyer and 
payment of the judgment entitles him to any goods 
not resold. 
(3) After the buyer has wrongfully rejected 
revoked acceptance of the goods or has failed to 
make a payment due or has repudiated (section 
70A-2-610), a seller who is held not entitled to 
the price under this section shall nevertheless 
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be awarded damages for nonacceptance under the 
preceding section. 
Knight has further appended hereto copies of the 
following documents: 
1. Memorandum Decision. (R. 189-92.) 
2. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 
196-99.) 
DATED THIS 3>0 day of July, 1985. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
J. Keith Adams 
R. Stephen Marshall 
By f^^^^^"1^^^^^ 
Attorneys for Appellant Dean Knight 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four true 
and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief, postage 
prepaid, this day of July, 1985, to: 
John C. Greene, Esq. 
Cotro-Manes, Warr, Green & Shand 
311 South State Street, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
fl'^yl^SlAyK^^Jj 
6470M 
073185 
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DEC 18 1984 
H r,<x 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL BAUM, dba 
BAUMWEAR BY MICHAEL BAUM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEAN KNIGHT, dba THE 
FASHION CORNER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-83-401 
Trial in the above matter was held on November 30, 1984. 
The Court having heard testimony, received evidence and exhibits, 
took the matter under advisement, and now renders its decision. 
The Court finds as follows: That the plaintiff offered 
to sell to the defendant at "going out of business" discount 
the goods in question; that defendant knew that the plaintiff 
was going out of business, and that the plaintiff was required 
to vacate his premises immediately, and that the plaintiff was 
moving out of New York City; that the defendant waived the receiving 
of a "sample" because of his knowledge of plaintiff's urgency 
in disposing of the goods; that defendant accepted the offer 
and authorized shipment of the goods; that the purchase order 
was signed by Grayson for the defendant, and that the purchase 
order specifically required "written authorization" for any 
goods to be returned; that the plaintiff told the defendant 
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at the time of sale that such sale was final, and that he could 
not take back the goods, and that the defendant in response 
thereto indicated he had faith in Grayson, and could always 
unload the goods if he did not like them; that the defendant 
attempted on his own to sell the goods on his own invoice subsequent 
to his receipt of the same in Salt Lake City; that after the 
defendant's failure to sell the goods on his own invoice, he 
then attempted to return the same, but was refused; that defendant 
sent the goods anyway, without written authorization; that the 
defendant never attempted to contact the plaintiff in regards 
to return of the goods until it was too late for these seasonal 
goods to be moved; that defendant knew from the beginning of 
the plaintiff moving from New York City back to his home in 
Ithaca, New York, but made no attempt to locate the plaintiff 
in a timely manner; that the defendant testified that he would 
have contacted the plaintiff if he had known his address; that 
the defendant admits that some manufacturers require written 
authorization before goods are returned; that the goods in question 
were not defective, but defendant simply did not like the aesthetics 
when receiving the same in Salt Lake City; that the goods were 
described to the defendant by Grayson and by the plaintiff prior 
to and at the time of the sale; that defendant knew the goods 
were seasonable, but made no timely effort to contact the plaintiff; 
that Grayson was not an employee or agent of the plaintiff but, 
ioo 
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in fact, a freelancer representative who, in this case, was 
more allied with the defendant than the plaintiff; that this 
was not an "approval sale"; and that Grayson had no authority 
to bind the plaintiff. 
Based upon the above findings, it is the conclusion of 
this Court that plaintiff is entitled to Judgment in the amount 
of $13,392.50, plus the legal rate of interest from October 
28, 1982 until paid. Each party will bear his own attorney's 
fees. 
Plaintiff's attorney will prepare the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, an^ Judgment. 
Dated this //; day of December, 1984. 
"LEONARD H. RU5S&N 
L/blSTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLFY 
Clerk 
Deptfty Ci ark 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following this \£ day of December, 1984: 
John C. Green 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
311 South State, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2377 
J. Keith Adams 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Attorneys for Defendant 
P. 0. Box 3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400 
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FILED IN CLERKS OFF!' 
Cn'.tLakoCi-ntv Utd 
JAN 10 1965 
JOHN C. GREEN, No. 1242 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
311 South State, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2377 
Telephone: (801) 531-1300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL BAUM, d.b.a. : FINDINGS OF FACT 
BAUMWEAR BY MICHAEL BAUM, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, Civil No. C83-401 
vs. 
: Judge Leonard H. Russon 
DEAN KNIGHT, d.b.a. THE 
FASHION CORNER, : 
Defendant. : 
The above-entitled matter having come on regularly 
for trial on the 30th day of November, 1984, before The 
Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge of the above-entitled 
Court. The plaintiff Michael Baurn was represented by his 
counsel of record, John C. Green, the defendant Dean Knight 
was represented by his counsel, R. Steven Marshall. And 
the witnesses having been sworn and having testified and 
the Court having heard the argument of counsel and having 
taken the matter under advisement and having issued its 
Memorandum Decision and being fully advised in the premises, 
the Court now makes these its 
is$ 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the defendant is a resident of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and operates a business known as 
The Fashion Corner located at 6825 South 400 West, Midvale, 
Utah. 
2. That on or about the 28th day of October, 1982, 
the plaintiff delivered to the defendant goods on open 
account for the sum of $13,392.50. 
3. That the plaintiff had offered to sell defendant 
at "going out of business" discount the goods in question. 
That the plaintiff was going out of business, that he was 
being required to vacate his premises immediately and that 
he was moving from New York City, New York. 
4. That defendant waived the right to receive a 
"sample" of the goods because he knew of plaintiff's urgency 
in disposing of the goods. 
5. That the defendant accepted the offer and authorized 
shipment of the goods. 
6. That a purchase order was prepared and signed 
by Mark Grayson for the defendant and that the purchase 
order specifically required "written authorization for 
any goods to be returned." 
7. That plaintiff told defendant at the time of the 
sale that such sale was final and that he "plaintiff" could 
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not take back the goods and that the defendant in response 
indicated he had faith in Grayson and could always unload 
the goods if he did not like them. 
8. That the defendant attempted to sell the goods 
on his own invoice after receipt of said goods. 
9. That after defendant's failure to sell the goods 
on his own invoice he attempted to return the same but 
was refused in a telephone conversation with the plaintiff 
but sent the goods anyway without any written authorization. 
10. The defendant in regards to the return of the 
goods until it was to late for the seasonal goods to be 
moved and further made no attempt to locate the plaintiff 
in a timely manner even though he knew he was moving to 
Ithacar New York. 
11. Defendant indicated that some manufacturers require 
written authorization before goods are returned but testified 
that the goods were not defective but that defendant simply 
did not like the aesthetics of the goods when they arrived 
even though the goods were described to the defendant by 
Mark Grayson and by plaintiff. 
12. The defendant knew the goods were seasonable but 
made no timely effort to contact plaintiff. 
13. Grayson was not an employee or agent of the plain-
tiff but was more closely allied with the defendant. 
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14. The defendant knew that the sale was not an 
"approva1 sale." 
FROM THE FOREGOING THE COURT NOW MAKES THESE, ITS 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff is entitled to Judgment in the amount of 
$13,392.50 plus the legal rate of interest from October 
28, 1982, until paid, together with his costs 
DATED . _ 
BY THE COURT: 
this of ^T^r/L^ , 198^ 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HiNDLEY 
Clerk
 % / , ' 
** OepuScierk JUDGE LEONAREMr: RUSSON 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Mr. 
R. Stephen Marshall of Van Cott# Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, 
Attorneys for Defendant, at 50 South Main Street, Suite 
1600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84144, on this 28th day of 
December, 1984. ^? s? C : : :^W^ 
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